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This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the defendant hospital is not 
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edge of the mat was suddenly lifted by the wind, because the hospital admittedly had no 
prior notice of a dangerous condition. 
Standard of Review: < ; . . . UK- V, Bom n mi , ; I, I i v g i i T ; 88 I 2 1 19 ; , 1 99 (I It; ih 
1989) ("challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only"). 
This issue was raised in the district court and decided in favor of the defendant 
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Standard of Review: Correctness. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 
1992). 
This issi le w.r. rnisiV !- -1. r 4 - -l4' • ! .:i lirk,-" l- " 
procedures, and was decided in favor of the defendant hospital. (R, 43, 14 \ 296.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
governed by case law, discussed herein. The second issue is governed by Rule 11, which 
is set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 10.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a premises liability action arising out of plaintiff s fall on an outside 
doormat at the defendant hospital. Plaintiff fell when a sudden gust of wind allegedly 
blew the edge of the mat into her legs and caused her to fall. (R. 1, 48; Amend. Br. of 
App. 8.) The hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that it had no prior 
notice of a dangerous condition. (R. 91-100.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment on the undisputed facts, also requesting sanctions for alleged 
violation of Rule 11. (R. 130-46.) The district court granted the hospital's motion, 
denied plaintiffs motion, and also denied her request for sanctions. (R. 294, Add. 1.) 
Plaintiff appealed from that final order of summary judgment. (R. 300.) The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As plaintiff concedes, the material facts are not in dispute. (Amend. Br. of App. 
10.) 
On a windy day in March 1995, around midday, plaintiff went to Cottonwood 
Hospital to visit her doctor. Plaintiffs own affidavit states that "the wind was strong, a 
high wind," with gusts up to "40 or so miles per hour," strong enough that she "felt the 
wind buffet [her] car a bit." (R. 180.) She testified that as she walked toward the 
hospital entrance and stepped onto the outside doormat, "the wind blew part of it up and 
2 
it caused [her] to fall." (Id, 1f 5.) While it is unclear exactly how plaintiff fell, the parties 
agree that her fall was caused by a sudden gust of wind that lifted the edge of the mat.1 
Hospital employees responded to the scene and helped plaintiff into the hospital. 
(R. 55-56.) Plaintiff claims permanent injuries resulting from the fall, but the record 
contains no evidence of such claims. (Plaintiffs brief, page 11, cites her affidavit, but 
the affidavit does not refer to resulting injuries, R. 179.) In any event, plaintiffs claimed 
injuries are not material to the legal issue of liability on this appeal. 
The doormat on which plaintiff fell was a standard commercial-grade mat, four 
feet by thirteen feet, made of indoor/outdoor carpet with rubberized backing to avoid 
slippage. It was manufactured by the 3-M Company for both indoor and outdoor use. 
The primary consideration in purchasing the mat was safety. The vendor demonstrated 
the stability of the mat by placing blowers at its edge and running wheelchairs over it to 
show that it would not blow or slide. The mat was designed and intended to be of 
sufficient length to allow enough steps for visitors' shoes to be cleaned of dirt and water 
before entering the hospital, for sanitation as well as safety. As an added precaution, 
Just how the doormat caused plaintiff to fall is not clear, and various accounts differ. One witness 
affidavit submitted by plaintiff states that the wind "was blowing pretty hard," and that as plaintiff 
approached the mat, "a gust of wind picked up the mat and hit her in the legs." (Burr Aff t, R. 169.) 
Another witness said "the wind just picked up the rug and caught her." (Parker Aff t, R. 177.) These 
same witnesses told the hospital's incident investigator, Richard Stout, that "just before the victim 
stepped onto the mat , . . . the wind blew and picked up the mat, which caused the victim to trip." (R. 56.) 
Plaintiffs counsel takes the position that "[w]hile she was on the mat, it lifted and flapped in the wind, 
striking her shins." (Amend. Br. of App. 10.) However, whether the mat flapped and tripped plaintiff 
before she stepped onto the mat, or flapped against her legs and caused her to fall after she stepped onto 
the mat is not material to this appeal, although it could be relevant to the defense of comparative 
negligence. For purposes of deciding liability on this appeal, the parties agree on the material fact that 
plaintiffs fall was caused by a sudden gust of wind that lifted the edge of the mat. 
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another mat of the same type was also used inside the hospital entrance on the tile floor. 
This standard mat was also used at other hospitals in the area. This mat was sold to the 
hospital in 1990, with a useful life of eight to ten years. During the five years it was in 
use prior to plaintiffs fall, the hospital conducted regular monthly inspections of the mat 
and surrounding premises, as part of normal risk management procedures, to look for 
damaged carpet or tile or any dangerous condition that could cause an accident. No such 
danger was ever observed or reported. (Deposition of Idella Warren 4-20, R. 160-64; 
First Affidavit of Ann Anderson, ffif 3-6, R. 28-29; Oral Findings, R. 251-52.) 
During the time the subject doormat was in use prior to plaintiffs fall, the hospital 
never received any information, report, or notice that the mat had been lifted or flapped 
by the wind, or that any person had fallen or tripped or had any other accident on the mat. 
(First Anderson Aff t, % 4, R. 29; Second Affidavit of Ann Anderson, ffij 3-6, R. 222-23; 
Deposition of Richard L. Stout 18, R. 150; Deposition of Ann Anderson 45-46, R. 155-
56; Warren Dep. 17-20, R. 164.) 2 
Plaintiff sued the hospital, alleging negligence in selection and use of the doormat. 
(R. 1-2.) The hospital initially moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
lifting of the mat by the wind should be considered an "act of God," thereby precluding a 
2
 Plaintiffs claim that Idella Warren and Ann Anderson "both observed that [the mat] had become 
light and limber and was obviously unsafe in wind" (Amend. Br. of App. 13) is misleading, as it is based 
on plaintiffs characterization of their remedial action in placing the mat sideways following the report of 
plaintiffs fall Both testified that they took this remedial action simply as a precaution to avoid any risk 
of reoccurrence. (Warren Dep. 10, R. 162; Anderson Dep. 56-57, R. 157-58.) Neither testified that the 
mat was then "unsafe," or, more importantly, that they had any reason to suspect the mat was unsafe 
prior to plaintiffs fall In any event, "evidence of the subsequent [remedial] measures is not admissible 
to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event [at issue]." Rule 407, Utah R. Evid. 
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finding of causation against the hospital. (R. 19-26.) However, the district court denied 
that motion because of a supposed material fact dispute over the strength of the wind. 
(R. 101-02, Add. 8-9.) The court specifically reserved for subsequent motion the 
question of the hospital's notice of a dangerous condition. (Id.) The hospital filed a 
second motion for summary judgment on the basis that it had no prior notice of a 
dangerous condition with the doormat. (R. 91-100.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment on liability and also requested Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds that 
the hospital's two motions were not supported by the law. (R. 130-46.) The district 
court granted summary judgment to the hospital on the grounds that it had no prior notice 
the mat could flip up in the wind; accordingly, the hospital breached no duty to plaintiff. 
(R. 294-95, Add. 2; Oral Findings, R. 253, Add. 7.) Plaintiff appealed that final order to 
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 300), which subsequently transferred the case to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Property owners are not the insurers of those who come upon their premises. 
Thus, in order for plaintiff to recover, she must show not only an injury, but also some 
basis for a finding of negligence. 
Slip-and-fall cases are divided into two classes. Under the first class, involving an 
unsafe condition that is temporary, the plaintiff must show that the owner knew of the 
condition and failed to correct it. Under the second class, involving an unsafe condition 
that is permanent or created by the owner, no proof of notice is necessary, but the 
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plaintiff must demonstrate that the condition is inherently dangerous and reasonably 
foreseeable. 
In this case, the allegedly unsafe condition was the brief lifting of the edge of the 
doormat by a sudden gust of wind. The district court correctly treated this as a temporary 
condition, requiring proof of the hospital's prior notice of the condition. However, the 
district court found, and plaintiff conceded, that the hospital had no prior notice of the 
mat ever lifting in the wind. Moreover, the hospital had no constructive notice, because 
the condition did not exist long enough to have been discovered and remedied by the 
hospital. 
Plaintiff cannot avoid the notice requirement by arguing that the wind-blown 
doormat was a permanent condition or a condition created by the hospital. The doormat 
was safe as it was left by the hospital; it was rendered unsafe only by the sudden gust of 
wind. Moreover, plaintiff failed to prove that the doormat presented an inherently 
dangerous condition that was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, absent notice of a 
dangerous condition, or proof that the condition was reasonably foreseeable, the hospital 
was properly awarded summary judgment. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to recover costs and attorney fees because she has failed to 
show a factual assertion that is unsupported by the record or a legal argument that is 
unwarranted by the law. 
Accordingly, the order of the district court should be affirmed in all respects. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
HOSPITAL IS NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S FALL BECAUSE 
THE HOSPITAL HAD NO PRIOR NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS 
CONDITION THAT RESULTED WHEN THE WIND SUDDENLY 
FLIPPED UP THE EDGE OF THE MAT. 
A. Legal Principles. 
Utah law governing premises liability for a slip or trip and fall is well established. 
As reaffirmed in the recent case of Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 
478 (Utah 1996), affirming summary judgment for the store owner, a property owner "is 
not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall," but is charged only with a 
duty of reasonable care. Stated otherwise, "property owners are not insurers of the safety 
of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees." Id. See 
also Silcoxv. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah App. 1991); Martin v. 
Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977) (affirming directed verdict for 
store owner). Thus, to prevail, a plaintiff must prove not only an injury, but that the 
injury was caused by negligence. 
Utah courts have identified two classes of negligence cases in the slip-and-fall 
context. In the first class, the property owner "must have either actual or constructive 
knowledge of the hazardous condition." Schnuphase, supra, at 478. This class 
"involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on 
the floor." Id. In such cases, the owner cannot be held liable for a resulting injury 
unless: (A) the owner had "either actual knowledge" of the condition, "or constructive 
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knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it;" and (B) "after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise 
of reasonable care he should have remedied it." Id. In the second class, the property 
owner must be shown to have "created the hazardous condition." Id. The second class 
"involves some unsafe condition of & permanent nature," such as the structure of a 
building or stairway, or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use for which the 
owner is responsible. In such cases, "where the defendant either created the condition, or 
is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of 
notice is necessary." Id. However, the plaintiff must "provide evidence of the 
foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition." Id. at 479. See also Allen v. 
Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). 
To illustrate the dichotomy between the two classes of cases, an icy spot on a 
sidewalk leading to a store entrance, resulting from snow and cold temperatures, is a 
temporary condition that predicates liability on knowledge of the store owner. Martin v. 
Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Similarly, a rock on the 
defendant's steps, Hampton v. Rowley Builder's Supply, 350 P.2d 151 (Utah 1960), or 
any matter of foreign substance on a store floor is considered a temporary condition that 
requires a showing of the owner's notice to establish liability. See Schnuphase v. 
Storehouse Markets, supra (ice cream dropped by a customer); Allen v. Federated Dairy 
Farms, supra (cottage cheese sample dropped by a customer); Long v. Smith Food King 
Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973) (pumpkin pie sample dropped on the floor); Koer v. 
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May fair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) (grape dropped on the floor). By contrast, 
an inclined terrazzo entryway that becomes wet and slippery in the rain "is part of the 
permanent structure of the building," requiring the exercise of reasonable care to remove 
the hazard through placement of a mat or abrasive material during wet weather. De 
Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1956).3 Likewise, when a store 
owner's chosen method of display and selling creates a situation that is likely to result in 
a slippery substance, such as lettuce, being dropped to the floor, the owner's notice of a 
dangerous condition is not relevant. Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(UtahApp. 1992). 
As demonstrated below, the present case is more analogous to, and fits within, the 
first category of cases, requiring proof of notice of the hazardous condition. 
B. Application to Present Case. 
The present case falls into the first class of slip-and-fall cases because the unsafe 
condition that caused plaintiffs fall was the wind-blown doormat, a condition of a 
temporary nature for which fault cannot be imputed to the hospital. The mat itself was 
not dangerous in its typical flat position; it became temporarily dangerous only when a 
gust of wind suddenly lifted its edge just as plaintiff stepped onto it. The mat resumed its 
innocuous flat position when the wind subsided. There is no evidence that the mat had 
3
 De Weese does not fall neatly into either class of cases defined above. The court presents the facts 
and issues with reference to the structural aspects of the entryway, but then applies a "notice" analysis 
that is consistent with a class-one case. Given its form of analysis, De Weese actually supports treating 
the doormat in this case as a class-one condition, making plaintiffs reliance on the case unpersuasive. In 
any event, it is mentioned here only for purposes of illustration. 
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ever been lifted or flipped up by the wind before that day, or at anytime during that day 
prior to plaintiffs fall. Accordingly, the hazardous condition was temporary and not of 
the hospital's making. The district court so ruled: 
The dangerous condition in this matter was not the rug per se, but it 
was a rug that would be susceptible to high gusts . . . of wind that 
happened, lift it and flap it in the wind, thus causing someone to fall upon 
it. 
The Court is of the opinion that this fall is within the temporary 
category rather than the permanent category.... [T]his is a temporary 
condition in that the —the use of the carpeting was for the safety of ingress 
and egress, to keep a dry area that people can go in and out of the hospital. 
The condition was of a temporary one in that the wind situation did not 
permanently create it, but created it only as to the gusts that were strong 
enough to move it. [R. 251.] 
Because the hazardous condition was temporary and not caused by the hospital, 
the plaintiff was properly required to show prior notice of the condition to establish 
liability. However, plaintiff concedes that she "produced no evidence that Defendant had 
actual knowledge the mat was unsafe." (Amend. Br. of App. 14.) This admission 
follows the district court's express oral ruling: 
[I]t appears uncontested that prior to the unfortunate incident in this 
case here, there was absolutely no notice at all and no indication that 
defendants were put on any notice that that condition was dangerous as to 
the condition which caused the fall in this matter, i.e., dangerous as to its 
flapping in a wind gust, thus causing the plaintiff, or any other person, to 
fall as a result of that flapping. [R. 253.] 
Absent proof of notice of the temporary hazard, the district court correctly granted 
summary judgment to the hospital. (Id.) 
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The district court's holding and analysis are in accordance with the analogous case 
of Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., supra. There, the plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy 
spot on a sidewalk leading to the store entrance. The evidence showed that snow had 
fallen intermittently through the day; however, store employees had cleared and salted 
the sidewalk, leaving it wet but not icy. The ice spot had formed subsequently, without 
being observed by anyone. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the store because 
there was no evidence that its employees had notice of the ice spot or an opportunity to 
remove it. 565 P.2d at 1140-41. The court reasoned that owners of buildings with 
public access "are not insurers against all forms of accidents" and have no duty "to mop 
the sidewalk dry or take other steps necessary to prevent the accumulation of moisture on 
the sidewalk that might freeze and create an icy condition." Id. at 1141. 
Similarly, the hospital in the present case, having placed an outdoor mat for the 
safety of visitors and sanitation of the hospital, cannot be expected to eliminate all risk of 
weather-related hazards, particularly a temporary hazard of which it had no prior notice. 
The sidewalk in Martin was not permanently or structurally unsafe; rather, it was 
rendered temporarily unsafe by the weather-caused accumulation and freezing of water. 
Likewise, the hospital's doormat was not permanently or inherently unsafe; it was 
rendered temporarily unsafe by the sudden gust of wind that lifted its edge under 
plaintiffs step. Accordingly, the temporarily wind-blown mat is more analogous to ice 
on a sidewalk, as in Martin, or food dropped on a floor, as in Schnuphase, than to the 
permanent, inclined terrazzo entry in De Weese or the hazardous sales display in 
11 
Canfield. Therefore, the court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law.4 
C. Plaintiffs Arguments on Classification and Constructive Notice. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred by treating this as a class one case, 
involving a temporary condition, rather than as a class two case, involving a permanent 
condition or hazard created by the property owner. (Amend. Br. of App. 23-28.) 
However, plaintiffs argument finds no support in the case law. 
Plaintiff relies primarily on Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah 
App. 1992), in which the plaintiff slipped and fell on a lettuce leaf near a lettuce display 
in the store. This Court applied the class-two principles, because the owner "chose a 
method of displaying and offering lettuce for sale where it was expected that third parties 
would remove and discard the outer leaves from heads of lettuce they intended to 
purchase." Id. at 1227. Under this method of operation, it was "reasonably foreseeable" 
that customers would drop some leaves to the floor and thereby create "a dangerous 
condition." Id. Because a dangerous condition was reasonably foreseeable, the owner's 
notice of that condition was "not relevant"; rather, the issue was whether the owner "took 
Because the hospital's doormat is not inherently unsafe, but was rendered so only by the sudden 
gust of wind, this Court could also affirm the summary judgment on the alternative basis of superseding 
natural cause. See, e.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (appellate court 
may affirm summary judgment on any proper ground, even though not relied on below). For example, in 
Morril v. Morril, 142 A. 337 (N.J. 1928), a young boy was injured on the defendant's property when a 
garage door was blown open by the wind and the previously broken latch hit him in the eye. The court 
ruled as a matter of law that the defendant had no duty to anticipate that the wind would blow the door 
open; accordingly, the proximate cause of the injury was not the existence of the broken door, or the 
owner's failure to fix the door latch, but the wind. The "innocuous act of ownership" cannot be held "to 
comprehend the unanticipated and unexpected blast of wind which it is conceded blew the door open." 
Id. at 340. "Where the alleged negligent act is separate from the injury done by the intervention of... 
the forces of nature, there can be no recovery." Id. at 341. 
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reasonable precautions to protect customers against the dangerous condition it created." 
Id 
However, Canfield is easily distinguishable from the present case because plaintiff 
here presented no evidence that the hospital created a dangerous condition merely by 
placing this standard doormat at its entry; rather, placement of an outside doormat is a 
standard safety precaution. The mat enhances safety; it does not create inherent danger. 
"If [the hospital's] duty required further safety measures, we are made to wonder what 
they would be, and how far the defendant would have to go in protecting the customers, 
both in method and in area. There does not appear to be any reasonable and practical 
answer to that inquiry." Long v. Smith Food King Store, supra, 531 P.2d at 362 
(affirming summary judgment for slip on pie). The hospital no more created a dangerous 
condition by merely placing a doormat than did the store owner in Martin in pouring a 
concrete sidewalk that later became slippery in a snowstorm. It is not the mat or the 
sidewalk that is dangerous, but the natural elements acting on the mat or sidewalk. In 
either condition, the hazard is temporary, and liability must be based on notice. See 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, supra, 918 P.2d at 479 (rejecting application of 
second theory of liability to slip on ice cream because merely allowing customers to eat 
ice cream in the store does not create a dangerous condition). 
Canfield is also distinguishable in that the plaintiff here produced no evidence that 
a dangerous condition was reasonably foreseeable. Plaintiff asserts that the blowing of 
the mat "obviously did not happen for the first time on the day of Plaintiff s fall." 
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(Amend. Br. of App. 26.) However, this assertion is mere conjecture, not based on 
evidence. Plaintiff concedes that the hospital had no prior notice of such an occurrence. 
(Id. at 28.) The hospital tested the mat for stability in wind and regularly inspected the 
mat for signs of danger; no danger was ever indicated. Given the absence of any prior 
notice of the mat flipping up in the wind, a dangerous condition was not reasonably 
foreseeable. As the court held in Schnuphase, supra, Canfield is limited to situations in 
which the owner creates "an inherently dangerous condition" that is reasonably 
foreseeable. 918 P.2d at 479. "[I]nherent danger and foreseeability remain essential 
elements of the claim" in the second class of cases. Id. The owner in Schnuphase did 
not create a foreseeable danger simply by selling ice cream to customers who could 
foreseeably drop some on the floor. Id. Because the plaintiff "failed to present evidence 
of the foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition," summary judgment was 
proper. Id. Similarly, in this case Canfield has no application because plaintiff has 
presented no evidence of a reasonably foreseeable inherent danger. By merely placing a 
mat at its entry, the hospital could not reasonably have foreseen that the mat would be 
blown by the wind so as to knock a visitor down. Therefore, this is not a class-two case, 
and the class-one requirement of notice of the danger applies. Because plaintiff 
admittedly failed to prove notice of a dangerous condition, summary judgment was 
appropriate.5 
5
 Plaintiff also cites De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956), for the proposition that 
a weather-related hazard should not be treated as a temporary condition. (Amend. Br. of App. 31-32.) 
There, the owner was held liable for the plaintiffs slip and fall on an inclined terrazzo entrance that had 
14 
Finally, plaintiff argues that the hospital had constructive notice of a dangerous 
condition because "the mat had been unsafe for some time," and the hospital should have 
discovered the danger and remedied it. (Amend. Br. of App. 29.) However, as shown 
above, plaintiff has presented no evidence that the mat was inherently unsafe. Rather 
than evidence, plaintiff offers only conjecture. The mere fact that the mat was more 
limber in the fifth year of its ten-year life than in its first year does not prove the mat was 
inherently unsafe. Again, what rendered this mat temporarily unsafe was the sudden and 
brief gust of wind that lifted its edge under plaintiffs step. That condition was so brief 
that no action by the hospital could have prevented the accident. Moreover, plaintiff has 
identified no feasible remedy that would not create other hazards. As the district court 
held: 
The evidence as to the age of the mat, testing performed at the time 
the mat was purchased, and the regular inspections of the premises 
conducted by defendant, shows, without dispute, that defendant did not 
have constructive knowledge that the mat had or would flip in the wind and 
create an unsafe condition. [R. 295, Add. 2.] 
In summary, the wind-blown doormat was a temporary condition of which the 
hospital had no actual or constructive knowledge. Nor did the doormat constitute an 
become wet and slippery in the snow. However, liability was based on the facts that "[t]he terrazzo 
surfacing is part of the permanent structure of the building," and that "the defendant knew of the 
characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet." Id. at 901. Accordingly, De Weese simply 
stands for the rule, followed in Canfield, that a property owner "is deemed to be informed of the 
dangerous condition" that foreseeably results from the owner's chosen method of operation. Canfield, 
supra, at 1226. It does not support the proposition that all weather-related hazards are permanent, or that 
a property owner is deemed to know of all weather-related hazards on the property. See Martin v. 
Safeway Stores Inc., supra (icy spot on sidewalk treated as temporary condition that required proof of 
notice). 
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inherently dangerous condition that was reasonably foreseeable, so as to render proof of 
notice unnecessary. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to 
the hospital.6 
POINT II: PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS UNDER 
RULE 11. 
Plaintiff argues that, based on Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., she is entitled to recover 
her litigation costs and attorney fees incurred in defending the motions below and in 
pursuing this appeal. (Amend. Br. of App. 35-38.) However, plaintiff presents no legal 
basis for such a recovery. 
Under Rule 11, an attorney who files any paper certifies that the paper is not 
presented for an improper purpose, that legal arguments are warranted by existing law, 
and that factual contentions have evidentiary support. (Add. 10.) Plaintiff argues that 
the hospital's motions were "wrong" on the facts and law, and that the hospital should be 
sanctioned for persuading the district court and "causing" this appeal. (Amend. Br. of 
6
 While the hospital is sympathetic to plaintiffs plight, not every injury justifies a monetary 
recovery. As observed in Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., supra, 565 P.2d at 1142: 
Not every accident that occurs gives rise to a cause of action upon which the 
party injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands of accidents occur every 
day for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even the 
ones who are injured. The character or extent of an injury may have no bearing upon the 
question of the liability therefor; neither has the wealth nor the poverty of either party to 
such a litigation anything to do with the question of liability for the accident. 
Plaintiff cites Lopez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 932 P.2d 601 (Utah 1997), for the proposition that she 
"established a prima facie case of negligence" and was therefore entitled to summary judgment. (Amend. Br. of 
App. 32.) However, Lopez deals with statutory liability of a railroad for a train striking a railroad worker. It has no 
possible application to the present case. Both parties' motions for summary judgment were properly considered 
under the cases discussed above. 
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App. 38.) However, plaintiff identifies no specific fact that was presented by the hospital 
without record support. Moreover, the legal arguments urged by the hospital were 
obviously warranted by the law, as the district court accepted and followed them. The 
hospital should not now be punished for prevailing. Even the arguments on the act-of-
God theory were warranted by existing law. (R. 24.) The motion was denied only 
because of a material fact dispute. (R. 102.) Accordingly, the district court correctly 
denied plaintiffs request for attorney fees (R. 296, Add. 3), and this Court should affirm 
that denial. Plaintiff has cited no authority for recovery of costs and fees by the losing 
party. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment to the hospital, and denying summary judgment to plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this * £ ^ clay of March, 1998. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: T^^C^g^ *& ^<^^r^ 
Charles W. Dahlquist, II 
Merrill F. Nelson 
David J. Hardy 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 
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COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., COTTONWOOD 
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 950905016PI 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter has came before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendant Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center. Defendant submitted memoranda in support 
of the Motion and Plaintiff submitted memoranda opposing the Motion. In connection with her 
opposition, plaintiff also filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. A hearing on 
the Motion for Summary Judgment was held September 23, 1996, with Samuel King and 
OOOOOl 
David J. Friel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and David J. Hardy appearing on behalf of 
defendant. At that hearing, plaintiff withdrew her Counter Motion. 
Following the court's ruling in favor of defendant on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment and to Grant Her Motions. 
Plaintiff and defendant filed memoranda in support of and opposing the Motion. A hearing on 
this Motion was held on January 10, 1997, with Samuel King and David J. Friel appearing on 
behalf of plaintiff and David J. Hardy on behalf of defendant. 
For purposes of this motion, the court has resolved doubts concerning questions of fact 
in favor of plaintiff and has therefore assumed that plaintiff was injured when a mat on 
defendant's property flipped in the wind and caused her to fall. The court further assumes that 
the mat flipping in the wind was an unsafe condition. 
Based on the record presented, the court finds as follows: 
1. The instrument causing plaintiff to fall, a mat flipping in the wind, was a 
condition of a temporary nature arising from the weather; 
2. There is no dispute of fact as to whether defendant had notice that the mat had 
or would flip in the wind, as all of the evidence presented to the court shows that defendant 
had no notice that the mat had ever previously flipped in the wind; 
3. The evidence as to the age of the mat, testing performed at the time the mat was 
purchased, and the regular inspections of the premises conducted by defendant, shows, without 
dispute, that defendant did not have constructive knowledge that the mat had or would flip in 
the wind and create an unsafe condition. 
000002 
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WHEREFORE, based on the findings set forth herein and other good cause shown, the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment 
and Grant Her Motions is denied, and Plaintiffs request for an award of attorney fees is 
denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs claims against IHC Health Services, Inc. 
(formerly IHC Hospitals, Inc.) and Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
i/ % DATED this ' ' day of January, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
*%?r~ 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is a case in which it comes 
down to whether or not I determine with confidence as to 
whether this.was a temporary on a. permanent condition* 
And I think the analysis is something more than just the 
use of — just, the employment of a rug outside of the 
entrance. 
The dangerous condition in this matter was not 
the rug per se, but it was a rug that would be 
susceptible to high gusts — to gusts of wind, however 
that is determined, and there's a conflict there — to 
gusts of wind that happened, lift it and flap it in the 
wind, thus causing someone to fall upon it. 
The Court is of the opinion that this fall is 
within the temporary category rather than the permanent 
category. And I reference that as to the descriptions 
given in the Schnuphase case, vs. Allen, that this is a 
temporary condition in that the — the use of the 
carpeting was for the safety o£ ingress and egress, to 
keep a dry area that people can go in and out of the 
hospital* The condition was of a temporary one in that 
the wind situation did not permanentlycreate it, but 
created it only as to the gusts that were strong enough 
to move it* 
The Court is aware of Mr. King's argument in 
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that they chose to put it that way? however, at the time 
the decision was made to use the carpetingr there was 
affidavits in. this case that indicated that a — certain 
tests were used to show that the carpet would not be 
"£bvedl''ijx~a""strong-wind•.-t-And,r—JLn_fact^ jthera was 
affidavits that -indicated .that a. blower was. used, and it 
did not change it-
The affidavit subsequent to the injury — I 
don't contest the contents — indicated that it was not 
of. the same condition as it was when it was purchased; 
however, there- was a warranty to some extent, of which 
you could — reasonably could rely upon it in that the 
carpeting was good for ten years.. But it wasn't, in my 
recollection, of the facts,, any qualifications as to ten 
years being indoor or outdoor ~ It was ten years - And X 
stand corrected if that's- the case.. 
But regardless of which, it was an. 
indoor/outdoor carpeting,, which has been -—...which- has 
been, conceded more or less- And. the use of that 
carpeting did not exceed even, two — wellr about 
two-thirds of.the life of /-^.even on. air eight-year: aspect 
of it,,-.or at least. 75vpercent of £tr on. an eight-year: 
aspect of It;; therefore,. Ltl'spresumed,, -then,- ^ for:: 
reasonable people to assume _that still —-/that, it was 
atilL wear-worthy at. that time -
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I also have to balance who bears the risk of 
this matter., And. that's the hardest, question I have to 
face- 'If there was any indication, that Cottonwood •-.-. 
Hospital had any inkling or notification, whatsoever as to 
the condition of this carpeting in a. windr there's- no 
question; in my mind that a- motion for summary" judgment 
would be denied,. and denied emphatically-
However,.; it appears uncontested that prior to 
the unfortunate incident in this case here, there was 
absolutely no notice at all and no indication that 
defendants were put on any notice that that condition was 
dangerous as to the condition which caused the fall in 
this matterr i»e-r dangerous as to its flapping in a wind 
gustr thus causing- the plaintiffr or any other: person, to 
fall as ^ a. result of that flapping-
Thereforer the finding of the Court is that 
this was a. temporary condition; that being* a. temporary 
conditionr that prior: notice must be given and shown-
The-, plaintiff has- the burden of doing- that- That is 
absent in the""recbrdr as farr as: I'm. concerned;: therefore,, 
motion for">summary judgment is: granted; on behalf: of 
defendant IHC Hospital-
Both sides of that' (Inaudible) or sanctions IJI. 
this matter- Both- sides a request for fees and/or 
sanctions are denied- T "find, that there was a 
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Charles W. Dahlquist, II (0798) 
Randy T. Austin (6171) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant IHC HOSPITAL, INC. 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE DURBOROW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IHC HOSPITAL, INC., COTTONWOOD 
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART 
AND RESERVING ISSUE FOR 
SUBSEQUENT MOTION 
Civil No. 950905016 PI 
Judae Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
at a regularly scheduled hearing on Monday, February 12, 1996, at 11:00 a.m. Randy T. 
Austin appeared on behalf of the Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. and Cottonwood Medical 
Center, and Samuel King appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. The Court having considered 
CUU008 
oral arguments and the memoranda, affidavits, and pleadings in this matter, and being fully 
advised in this matter, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment based on the Act of God doctrine 
is denied. There is a genuine issue of material facts with regard to whether the wind which 
raised the mat at issue in this matter was "unusual and unexpected." 
2. The Court does not reach and specifically reserves for further briefing and 
later consideration the question of whether the Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment 
due to the fact that it had no notice or knowledge that the mat at issue could be lifted by 
winds. 
3. The Defendant may in its discretion file an additional motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Notice iss\i£. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Samuel King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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33 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
the papers should not be deemed to violate the Paragraph (f). The changes in this para-
rule merely because they were prepared in a graph make it clear that the clerk must accept 
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this all papers for riling, even though they may vio-
paragraph also removes any confusion concern- iate the rule, but the clerk may require counsel 
ing the top margin and left margin require-
 to substitute conforming for nonconforming pa-
ments (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively),
 p e r s rrhQ c l e r k ^ g i y e n d i s c r e t i o n to w a i v e re_ 
and this paragraph imposes new requirements
 q u i r e m ent8 of the rule for parties who are not 
for right and bottom margins (both one-half
 r e p r e 8 e n t e d b y ^ ^ j . f o r g o o d c a u s e s h o w n > 
m£, i_ / ^ rm_- i_ i. • i_ • the court may relieve parties of the obligation 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph, which is an , , ... ,, , «*.?•* 
addition to the rule, requires U e d signature to f 0 ^ ™ * * " " * « « V P " * * x t , . 
lines and signatures to permanent black or Compiler's Notes - Subdivisions (a) to (c) 
blue ink 8 r u^e a r e 3 m u ' a r to Rule 10, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of a pleading to clarify or explain the same; an 
p t M «f exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
TT ' . ,. of supplying necessary material averments nor 
C*tede ^ P ng3* can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
1
 ' of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
Exhibits. v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
—Use as pleadings. Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
C.J.S. —71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98, Key Numbers. — Pleading •» 4, 13, 15, 
371 to 375, 418. 38V2 to 75, 307 to 312, 340. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
representations to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, 
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. 
Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. 
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be 
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being 
called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, 
or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are war-
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary sup-
port or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, 
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information 
or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject 
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attor-
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neys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible 
for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be 
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe 
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be 
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented 
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such 
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, 
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appro-
priately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party 
prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees 
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circum-
stances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations 
committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter 
an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdi-
vision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause 
why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for viola-
tion of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of 
such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject 
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist 
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the 
reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of 
the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented 
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initia-
tive unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary 
dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party 
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the con-
duct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis 
for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule 
do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and 
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1997.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1997 
amendments conform state Rule 11 with fed-
eral Rule 11. (5ne difference between the rules 
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible 
for violations by a member of the firm. Federal 
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) states: "Absent exceptional 
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly 
responsible for violations committed by its 
partners, associates, and employees." Under 
the federal rule, joint responsibility is pre-
sumed unless the judge determines not to im-
pose joint responsibility. State Rule 11(c)(1)(A) 
provides: "In appropriate circumstances, a law 
firm may be held jointly responsible for viola-
tions committed by its partners, members, and 
employees." Under the state rule, joint respon-
sibility is not presumed, and the judge may 
impose joint responsibility in appropriate cir-
cumstances. What constitutes appropriate cir-
cumstances is left to the discretion of the judge, 
but might include: repeated violations, espe-
cially after earlier sanctions; firm-wide 
sanctionable practices; or a sanctionable prac-
tice approved by a supervising attorney and 
committed by a subordinate. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment rewrote this rule. 
Compiler^ Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 11, F.R.C.P. 
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